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Abstract 
The concept of innateness is rarely discussed in the context of artificial intelligence. When it is 
discussed, or hinted at, it is often the context of trying to reduce the amount of innate machinery 
in a given system. In this paper, I consider as a test case a recent series of papers by Silver et al 
(Silver et al., 2017a) on AlphaGo and its successors that have been presented as an argument that 
a  “even in the most challenging of domains: it is possible to train to superhuman level, without 
human examples or guidance”,  “starting tabula rasa.”   
I argue that these claims are overstated, for multiple reasons. I close by arguing that artificial 
intelligence needs greater attention to innateness, and I point to some proposals about what that 
innateness might look like.  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1. An ancient debate, updated for the machine age 
One of the oldest debates in intellectual history revolves around the somewhat nebulous  concept 2
of innateness. How much of the human mind is built-in, and how much of it is constructed by 
experience? Plato famously become one of nativism’s first advocates, in his dialogue the Meno, 
when he argued that a slave boy had knowledge of geometry, despite the lack of any formal 
training. In modern times, Noam Chomsky is perhaps the scholar most identified with nativism, 
having argued that human children could not acquire human language in the fashion that they 
(nearly) universally do, unless they were born with a “language acquisition device” (Chomsky, 
1965), or what Steven Pinker (Pinker, 1994) has called a “language instinct.” In contrast, 
empiricists, such as John Locke (Locke, 1694), and in modern times, the late developmental 
psychologist Elizabeth Bates and cognitive scientist Jeff Elman (Elman, 1996), have taken 
something close to a “blank slate” or tabula rasa view, arguing that our knowledge come from 
experience, delivered through the senses.   
Virtually all modern observers would concede that genes and experience work together; it is 
“nature and nurture”, not “nature versus nurture”. No nativist, for instance, would doubt that we 
are also born with specific biological machinery that allows us to learn. Chomsky’s Language 
Acquisition Device should be viewed precisely as an innate learning mechanism, and nativists 
such as Pinker, Peter Marler (Marler, 2004) and myself (Marcus, 2004) have frequently argued 
for a view in which a significant part of a creature’s innate armamentarium consists not of 
specific knowledge but of learning mechanisms, a form of innateness that enables learning.  
As discussed below, there is ample reason to believe that humans and many other creatures are 
born with significant amounts of innate machinery.  The guiding question for the current paper is 
whether artificially intelligent systems ought similarly to be endowed with significant amounts 
of innate machinery, or whether, in virtue of the powerful learning systems that have recently 
been developed, it might suffice for such systems to work in a more bottom up, tabula rasa 
fashion. 
2. Innateness in biological creatures 
In a book length review of the biology of innateness (Marcus, 2004) I made a foundational 
distinction between what I called “prewiring” and “rewiring”, and suggested that the biological 
evidence for both processes was overwhelming.  
!  According to Mameli and Bateson (2006) the term innateness has been used in over two dozen ways, ranging from 2
“universal” to “biological” to “acquired independently of learning”; it is the latter that I have in mind. 
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Over 90% of our genes are expressed in the development of the brain (Miller et al., 2014; 
Bakken et al., 2016; Kang et al., 2011), and a significant number of those are expressed 
selectively, in a way that allows the brain to self-assemble, even, to some non-trivial degree in 
the absence of experience. Mechanisms such as cell division, cell differentiation, cell migration, 
cell death, and axon guidance combine to self-assemble a rich first draft of the human brain, even 
prior to experience. Even in the absence of synaptic transmission, the primary mechanism by 
which experience is conveyed to the brain, the basic structure of the newborn brain is preserved 
(Verhage et al., 2000). 
Commensurate with this, there is considerable evidence from the psychological literature that 
children are endowed early in life with what Spelke has called a “core knowledge” of domains 
like physics (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). A long series of papers reviewed there suggests, for 
example, that infants have some ability to track and reason about objects. And, as Spelke (1994) 
has noted, it is difficult to see how knowledge of abstractions like objects, sets, and places could 
arise through (e.g.,) associative learning. 
Vouloumanos and Werker (Vouloumanos and Werker, 2007a, 2007b) have shown that neonates 
can distinguish speech from closely-matched sine-wave analogues, even though the relevant 
information for making such distinctions is unlikely to percolate through to the womb. My own 
team  discovered that 8-month-old infants could learn abstract rules from two minutes’ exposure 
to artificial grammars (Gervain, Berent, & Werker, 2012). Gervain et al (2012) found that 
newborns could perform similar computations. A 2017 study in Current Biology which showed 
that late-term human fetuses could distinguish faces from inverted faces without any direct 
experience at all (Reid et al., 2017). Other work has suggested that deaf children can invent 
language with no direct model (Senghas, Kita, & Ozyürek, 2004), and that language can be 
selectively impaired even in children with normal cognitive function (van der Lely & Pinker, 
2014). 
Elsewhere in the animal kingdom are many precocial animals with a capacity to walk and (to 
some degree) navigate obstacles within moments of birth.  Newborn chicks appear to be able to 
recognize faces  (Wood & Wood, 2015) and to distinguish biological motion from nonbiological 
motion (Mayer, Rosa-Salva, Morbioli, & Vallortigara, 2017). 
Many vital questions remain. We don’t know precisely what innate machinery humans (or other 
creatures) are born with, and we don’t know how much of that machinery is tied to specific 
domains (e.g., language learning) and how much is domain-general (e.g., it is conceivable that 
mechanisms for acquiring representing abstract hierarchical structures might be useful in 
planning, motor control, language and other domains).  And evidence for innateness doesn’t 
mean that no (subsequent) learning takes place, it just means that whatever learning there is takes 
place against a background of some machinery that precedes learning; evidence for prewiring 
doesn’t speak against rewiring, but nor does evidence for (later) rewiring speak against evidence 
for prewiring. 
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The bottom line is that there is more than enough evidence for innateness across multiple fields 
that we can reasonably presume for present purposes that humans (and other creatures) are born 
with significant amounts of innate machinery, and instead turn now to the related question of 
whether innate machinery might be a prerequisite for “human-level” artificial intelligence, 
sometimes referred to as  “artificial general intelligence” [AGI]).  
3. Innateness in machines 
One might think of cognition as a function over four variables 
1.  !  
where a = innate algorithms (whether domain-specific or domain-general), r = innate 
representational formats (again, domain-specific or otherwise), k = innate knowledge (again, 
domain-specific or otherwise), and e = experience. That is, the cognition of a given agent 
(biological or artificial) is a function of its innate algorithms, its innate representational formats, 
its innate knowledge, and experience.  
A true blank slate would set k and r to zero, set a to some extremely minimal value (e.g., an 
operation for adjusting weights relative to reinforcement signals), and leave the rest to 
experience.  This is essentially the view that Locke (1694) articulated 
All ideas come from sensation or reflection.  
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:— 
How comes it to be furnished? ....  
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?  
To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. 
Deep learning  pioneer Yann LeCun similarly appears to believe that both a, r and k should 3
approach zero, as he made clear at an October 5, 2017 debate with me at NYU [tinyurl.com/
lecunmarcusdebate]. In particular, in my own remarks I proposed a list of ten candidate elements 
that I felt would be important for AI, mostly on the representational side (see section 5). When 
questioned about that list by the moderator (David Chalmers) LeCun took a strong empiricist 
position, very much in the spirit of John Locke, suggesting that none of those 10 elements 
needed to be innate for AI systems. (Nor did he suggest any others.) 
cog n it io n = f (a , r, k , e)
 For a recent critical appraisal of deep learning, see Marcus {&, 2018, #96831} and further discussion at https://3
medium.com/@GaryMarcus/in-defense-of-skepticism-about-deep-learning-6e8bfd5ae0f1
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What AI researchers in general think about the values of a, r, k, and e, is largely unknown, in part 
because few researchers ever explicitly discuss the question. As Chalmers pointed out in a 
Facebook message to LeCun and myself in September 2017, nativism is hardly a central topic in 
contemporary AI thought.  “When I do a google search on "nativism AI"”, Chalmers wrote , “I 
get a "did you mean ..." message”.  Or, as Ken Forbus put it to me in an email, “the issue is 
literally not on the table for most AI people”; people get wrapped up in the practicalities of their 
immediate research, and don’t really tend to think about nativism at all.   
Others seem downright opposed, on principle; Tom Dietterich, for instance, told me in a recent 
email that “I think most ML people believe that methods for incorporating prior knowledge in 
the form of symbolic rules (or their probabilistic equivalent) are too heavy-handed and, while 
very useful from an engineering point of view, don't contribute to a plausible theory of general 
intelligence.” (How to square this is the literature from biology, psychology, ethology, and 
neuroscience, I do not know.) 
Some boundary conditions are clear. A classic result called the No Free Lunch theorem (Wolpert, 
1996) effectively shows that a cannot literally be zero; every system will generalize in different 
ways, depending on what initial algorithm is specified, and no algorithm is uniquely best; 
different algorithms are suited to different problems. For example, as Pedro Domingos recently 
observed in an email 
ML paradigms differ in is what assumptions they encode, and what form of additional 
knowledge they make it easy to encode. For example, neural nets assume continuity, 
graphical models assume conditional independence, and instance-based learning assumes 
similarity; and correspondingly, neural nets make it easy to incorporate types of continuity 
like translation invariance, graphical models [make it easy to incorporate] conditional 
independences, and [instance-based models make it easy to incorporate] knowledge of what 
makes things similar (in the kernel or distance measure, which will vary with the domain).  
Another classic paper, by Stuart Geman et al (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992)similarly 
showed that r can never be zero, and that the choice of r has significant impact on performance, 
arguably more important than the choice of algorithms. (Lachter and Bever(1988) and Pinker and 
Prince (Pinker & Prince, 1988) made this point more vividly but less formally, with respect to 
learning the English past tense.) 
Perhaps the strongest argument for keeping the values of a, r, and k small, while relying on a 
high value of e, comes from DeepMind’s groundbreaking work on playing classical board games 
through reinforcement learning, masterfully presented by Demis Hassabis at December 7, 2017 
NIPS Symposium on Kinds of Intelligence, and in a series of three papers. The first, published in 
Nature, introduced AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016); the second, also published in Nature, focused 
on a more powerful successor,  AlphaGo Zero (Silver et al., 2017a); the third focused on Alpha 
Zero, a still-more powerful variation on the theme that played Go, chess and shogi at 
unprecedented levels, published on arXiv, December 2017 (Silver et al., 2017b).   
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Collectively, I will refer to these three systems, a marvel of AI engineering, as AlphaStar.  
Before proceeding it’s import clarify that although some people have read my recent critique of 
deep learning, and may imagine this paper to be extension of those, I don’t view AlphaStar as a 
relatively unstructured “end-to-end” deep learning system, of the sort one typically finds in 
image recognition, in which one might expect nothing other than a deep network with many 
layers, with pixels on the input, and move choices on the output. Rather, AlphaStar is something 
much closer to the sort of thing I have been advocating:  a deeply structured hybrid, making 
important use of deep learning, but also reliant on rich integration with more traditional symbolic 
techniques like tree search. It’s a system in which deep learning is a fundamental tool, but 
embedded in a symbolic context. In that respect it is to some degree closer to what I was 
advocating architecturally.  
And what AlphaStar does, it obviously does extremely effectively; my question here is not about 
whether it works, but about what the system’s architecture and results mean, for thinking about 
nature and nurture with respect to AI.  4
4. AlphaStar, and what it tells us about innateness 
4.1. How DeepMind framed their results, and how they should 
actually be interpreted. 
DeepMind’s 2017 Nature paper frames their results, throughout, as an implicit, and at times 
explicit, argument for a strong version of empiricism. Their strongly antinativist framing began 
with title of the paper, which purported to show that they had demonstrated “Mastering the game 
of Go without human knowledge”. The abstract similarly claimed that the system they presented 
achieved its undeniably impressive results by “starting tabula rasa.” The conclusions report that 
the paper had shown that “a pure reinforcement learning approach is fully feasible, even in the 
most challenging of domains: it is possible to train to superhuman level, without human 
 Another question, perhaps debatable, is whether AlphaStar should be considered to be an example of unsupervised 4
learning. I think another (perhaps original?) term might be “self-supervised”. Although AlphaGo Zero and 
AlphaZero don’t require libraries of human games, they generate their own training databases, and learn from those 
in a partly supervised fashion. Also, where some unsupervised systems work entirely without labeled data, and 
induce essentially everything, AlphaGo Zero and Alpha Zero are given rules in advance and game-specific 
representations in advance, which is somewhat out of the spirit of traditional approaches to unsupervised learning. 
Either way, it is certainly an outstanding and effective example of reinforcement learning. 
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examples or guidance, given no knowledge of the domain beyond basic rules”, repeating the 
claim that system was able to do all this “starting tabula rasa.”  
In reality, the system absolutely is not a tabula rasa, in the sense of being a literal blank slate; 
neither a nor r nor k in equation 1 are set to zero, as one might expect in a true blank slate. Nor is 
AlphaStar in fact a pure reinforcement learning system, or (contra the title) a system that 
altogether lacked human guidance. 
Based on a reading of the abstract, a naive reader might presume, for example, that AlphaGo 
Zero might have induced — from experience — all that is needed to play in Go, and that the 
programmers themselves required no knowledge of Go in order to construct their system. The 
reality is quite different.  
Reinforcement learning is supplement with other techniques, and human knowledge did in fact 
enter the system. Most of the paper’s seventeen authors were deeply familiar with Go. One, Fan 
Hui, is a four time European go champion;  ten were authors on the previous (2016) DeepMind 
paper that introduced AlphaGo, then the greatest Go program all time. In no way could the team 
be considered to be naive either to the nature of Go or the requirements necessary for building 
computer systems for computer Go. 
Many aspects of their system follow both from previous studies of computer Go (and game 
playing in general) and from the nature of the problem itself. For instance, like virtually all 
computer Go systems of the last decade, the system built in Monte Carlo tree search, a technique, 
most often used in games, for evaluating moves and countermoves, with intermediate results 
accumulated and tested statistically over tree structures. Similarly, artfully placed convolutional 
layers allow the system to recognize that many patterns on the board are translation invariant.  5
(The convolutional layers are characteristic of deep learning systems, but because of the 
inclusion of the Monte Carlo Tree Search mechanisms, the systems as a whole is more of a 
hybrid, combining some aspects of deep learning with other aspects of classical symbol-
manipulating systems.) 
Crucially, the Monte Carlo tree structure apparatus was not learned from the data, by pure 
reinforcement learning. Rather, it was built in innately, into each iteration of AlphaStar, by 
DeepMind’s programmers.  (This tree search machinery was implemented as a mixture of 
algorithms and (tree) representations, hence contributed to both a and r not being zero in 
equation 1.) 
 Groups of Go stones are not fully translational invariant, because of things like board edges and interactions with 5
other clusters of stones; still a great deal of knowledge consists in knowing about patterns, some known as joseki, 
that are to, a first approximation, translationally invariant in their expect outcomes; I would be astonished if 
DeepMind could produce a variant of Alpha* that worked as well with comparable amounts of training time without 
incorporation convolution or something doing similar work, of recognizing common sets of patterns even as they 
appear in different locations across the game board. 
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Likewise, the convolutional layers  were structured in a precise way, not induced purely via 6
reinforcement learning, with parameters appropriate for playing Go. AlphaGo Zero also included 
a special sampling algorithm for dealing with the symmetries (eg reflections and rotations) of Go 
boards, and both the board structure and the game rules themselves (representational 
assumptions, i.e., r in equation 1) were innate, rather than induced from visual images or 
exposure to games.  
Crucially, these sampling mechanisms, arguably a mixture of innate algorithms and knowledge, 
were not included in AlphaZero’s chess experiments, where presumably they would lead to a 
degradation, rather than an improvement (chess, unlike Go, is not symmetrical under rotation). 
This choice of which Monte Carlo augmentations to include or not include were again 
presumably made with human knowledge, rather than learned. 
Interestingly, there is a strong case to be made that AlphaStar has far more innate machinery than 
DeepMind’s earlier work on Atari games (Mnih et al., 2015) , which actually in at least four 
ways comes closer to being a genuinely blank slate. First, the Atari system did not preprogram in 
any game rules; second, it did not preprogram any game-specific representations (beyond the 
pixels of the display, the score, and the possible moves of an 8-direction joystick and 
accompanying “fire” button). Third, it did not include any game-specific data augmentation. 
Finally, fourth and most important, it did not build in any sort of tree search mechanisms.  
Could the Atari system have been used for Go? Since it would have been so easy for them to try, 
I suspect that DeepMind tried applying their Atari game system to Go, but that the system failed, 
and that they did not report that failure. (If true, this deeply problematic. As Henderson et al 
(2017) have recently noted, a growing concern for the entire field of machine learning is that 
many things are tried, but few are published, with a vast array of hyperparameters, architectures, 
and representational schemes relegated to file drawers.  Precisely this sort of replicability and 
file-drawer crisis has recently undermined psychology and medicine, and could lead to major 
problems within machine learning, too. The field of machine learning would greatly benefit from 
the sort of preregistration and systematic null result reporting in which those fields are now 
beginning to engage.) 
On plausible assumption that the Atari system could not, unaltered, induce state-of-the-art Go 
performance, a reasonable inference is that AlphaGo’s superior performance stems in part from 
the additional innate structure that it embodies, relative to the Atari game system.  
Thus, rather being an illustration of the power of tabula rasa learning, AlphaGo is actually an 
illustration of the opposite: of the power of building in the right stuff to begin with.  
Convolutional layers build in what vision scientists call translational variance, allowing a system to recognize an 6
object in any location as it moves across the image plane.
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With the right initial algorithms and knowledge, complex problems are learnable (or learnable 
given some sort of real-world constraints on compute and data). Without the the right initial 
algorithms, representations and knowledge, many problems remain out of reach.  Convolution is 
the prior that has made the field of deep learning work; tree search has been vital for game 
playing. AlphaZero has combined the two. 
Ironies abound. To begin with, in some ways AlphaZero is actually more tied to certain kinds of 
innate representations and algorithms than people are. It is doubtful, for example, that humans 
have Monte Carlo tree search innately wired in and certainly not with the rules of Go or the 
structure of the board. To the extent that AlphaStar does build in innate algorithms, knowledge 
and representations, its constructs are more specific to Go and to game playing than any human 
might plausibly possess. Too much so, in fact; whereas a human can learn many games without 
specific innate representational features for any particular game, each implementation of 
AlphaStar is innately endowed with game-specific features that lock the system to one particular 
realization of one particular game, focusing on one particular problem. Humans are vastly more 
flexible in how they approach problems, and could, for example, answer a wide range questions 
about the game (is the current board symmetrical? Are there more black stones on the board than 
white? Where could I play if I wanted to deliberately lose territory?) or play on boards of a 
different size or shape, without retraining from scratch; AlphaStar could handle none of that. 
Most tellingly humans can quickly learn the rules and representations of novel games; AlphaStar 
at present has no capacity for learning such rules or game representations; instead it is entirely 
reliant on human programmers embedding those rules into the system innately. 
The final irony is that nativists like Chomsky, Pinker, and myself have long argued that one of 
the most important starting conditions for learning language is having innate machinery for 
representing and manipulating trees. Rather than debunking our claims, DeepMind has provided 
fresh evidence for them, inasmuch as — despite considerable experimentation, with vast 
computational resources—they have been unable to succeed in complex board games without 
incorporating rich tree-theoretic innate starting points. 
4.2 Beyond board games of perfect information 
Go, chess, and shogi are often thought of as board games of perfect information; each player can, 
at any time, see exactly what is happening. There is no hidden information as in “fog of war”, in 
which one player might be unaware of another maneuvers, and no uncertainty (as there is in 
poker or backgammon or the stock market). For this reason, games like Go, chess, and shogi are 
particularly amenable to a brute force, big data approach. A crucial question, in interpreting the 
AlphaStar results, is the degree to which the same mechanisms could solve a broader range of 
problems. 
To a noticeable degree, the AlphaGo Zero paper invited the inference that their mechanisms 
might be general purpose in nature, both by referring to Go as “the most challenging domains” 
and by failing to consider any of the ways in which other problems (e.g., outside of Go) might 
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not be amenable to the same sort of solution.  Their conclusions in full read as follows, with little 
if any of the sort of hedging that is customary in scientific literature: 
Our results comprehensively demonstrate that a pure reinforcement learning approach is fully 
feasible, even in the most challenging of domains: it is possible to train to superhuman level, 
without human examples or guidance, given no knowledge of the domain beyond basic rules. 
Furthermore, a pure reinforcement learning approach requires just a few more hours to train, and 
achieves much better asymptotic performance, compared to training on human expert data. Using 
this approach, AlphaGo Zero defeated the strongest previous versions of AlphaGo, which were 
trained from human data using handcrafted features, by a large margin. 
Humankind has accumulated Go knowledge from millions of games played over thousands of 
years, collectively distilled into patterns, proverbs and books. In the space of a few days, starting 
tabula rasa, AlphaGo Zero was able to rediscover much of this Go knowledge, as well as novel 
strategies that provide new insights into the oldest of games.” 
No hedges or statements on the limits of scope were supplied, and the question of whether or not 
the result was general for other challenges was not addressed. 
Alas, what’s true for Go may not be true for many other challenges.  Even relative to other board 
games, Go is challenging in some ways, but not all.  Go demands strong pattern recognition and 
tree search skills, but other games are challenging in other ways. Civilization, for example, 
requires decision-making under uncertainty, design of transportation networks, and evaluating 
multiple kinds of tradeoffs (what to build, investment decisions, arms versus agriculture, etc).  
Diplomacy requires forming coalitions, demanding theory of mind. Charades requires acting 
skills, linguistic skills, and theory of mind, and so forth.   
To take but one example, Moravčík et al’s recent success on Poker (Moravčík et al., 2017), 
DeepStack, required a different (though related) set of innate structures, and it is no accident that 
the innate structures in DeepMind’s Atari game experiments (Mnih et al., 2015) differ markedly 
from the innate machinery it used for perfect-information board games. The Atari games (as 
studied) were one-player games that could be largely played by the application of short-term 
tactics, hence tree search was of little value, whereas Go, chess and Shogi demand something 
like tree search because of the inherent profusion of alternatives. DeepMind tuned the machinery 
accordingly for each class of games. Even to handle the union of these two types of challenges 
(video games without prior knowledge, and board games with innate rules), DeepMind would 
likely require a broader set of innate machinery than either system used on its own.  
And the further one goes from straightforward games, the more one may need to enrich the set of 
primitives. Ultimately, it seems likely that many different types of tasks will have their own 
innate requirements: Monte Carlo tree search for board games, syntactic tree manipulation 
operations for language understanding, geometric primitives for 3-D scene understanding, theory 
of mind for problems demanding social coalitions, and so forth.  
Taken together, the full set of primitives may look less like a tabula rasa and more like the 
spatiotemporal manifold that Immanuel Kant (1781) envisioned, or like the sort of things that 
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strong nativists like myself, Noam Chomsky, Elizabeth Spelke, Steve Pinker and the late Jerry 
Fodor have envisioned. 
Unfortunately, DeepMind has not yet reported either success or failures of AlphaGo outside of 
the domain of perfect-information games, even on tasks such as Atari that they are quite familiar 
with. Although a naive reader might view AlphaZero’s core technology as a kind of universal 
solvent, capable of solving a variety of challenge problems in a wide cross section of domains, 
that conjecture has not been explicitly tested in print.  
Outside of Go, the prospects DeepMind has applied somewhat similar techniques (e.g., 
reinforcement learning, though not AlphaStar per se) to some other challenging problems, 
including language learning (Hermann et al., 2017).  But the results there are not nearly as 
compelling as for Go or Chess; the AI systems are much slower to learn novel words than human 
children (in terms of amount of data required) and much slower to generalize semantic concepts 
like negation.  
Even on alternative challenges within the space of Go, there is some reason for pessimism. For 
example, the system might need to be retrained from scratch in order to play on a game board of 
a different size or shape, or to play a game with a different goal (e.g. to lose rather than to win); 
it’s unclear whether its knowledge could be repurposed towards teaching in the way that a 
human’s knowledge could be. (Josh Tenenbaum, Elizabeth Spelke, and Ernie Davis all recently 
reminded of this point to me, in different ways, independently.) The grain level of what’s innate 
in AlphaStar is a system that is built to play Go (or chess, or Shogi) on a board of a specific size; 
the grain level of what’s innate in a person is utterly different; nothing like board sizes or rules 
are innate.  There is also no evidence that the system could transfer what it has learned from one 
game to another, unlike humans who can to some extent transfer knowledge, e.g., between 
different turn-based-games. 
In the final analysis, although the AlphaStar demonstrations are undeniably impressive, they 
simply cannot justify the broader claims that their 2017 Nature article seems to invite. Go is 
certainly a genuinely challenging problem, just as the DeepMind team suggests, but there is no 
particular reason to think that other hard problems would be solvable with the same innate 
machinery.  
At a broader level, virtually every AI system contains lots of innate machinery that isn’t 
acknowledged as such. Neural networks, for example, routinely contain innate assumptions 
about how many layers should be included, how many units should be in each layer, what the 
input and output units should stand for, what activation function individual units should follow, 
what sort of learning rule to use, what sort of learning rate to adopt, how many training examples 
should be used in a training sequence, and so forth; it has also become popular to use 
“curriculum-based learning”, in which the (innate) habits of a supervisor or teacher are 
determined prior to learning.  These commitments differ from one model to the next, e.g. 
LSTM’s vs CNN’s vs ResNets vs Memory networks vs Tree-RNNS, etc.. Only rarely are these 
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commitments made however in terms of explicit discussions about innateness or qua hypotheses 
about putative cognitive functions. 
All of this may be necessary in order to get systems to work, but too little of it seems principled 
with respect to the question of what should be innate, in part because virtually none of it engages 
with the sort of questions that a psychologist might ask about innateness, based on an 
understanding of how human cognitive creatures grow.  
5. Innate machinery 
If reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo tree search turn out not to be enough innate 
machinery, on their own, to support artificial general intelligence, what else might we be looking 
for? At my October 5, 2017 debate with Yann LeCun, I had an opportunity to draw up a 
preliminary list. The list I proposed was, roughly, the union of a set of computational primitives 
that I had advocated for in my book The Algebraic Mind (Marcus, 2001), and a set of conceptual 
primitives drawn from Elizabeth Spelke’s work on cognitive development (Spelke, 1994):   
• Representations of objects 
• Structured, algebraic representations 
• Operations over variables 
• A type-token distinction 
• A capacity to represent sets, locations, paths, trajectories, obstacles and enduring 
individuals 
• A way of representing the affordances of objects 
• Spatiotemporal contiguity 
• Causality 
• Translational invariance 
• Capacity for cost-benefit analysis 
Provocatively, LeCun argued (when pushed by the moderator, David Chalmers) that none of 
these need be innate.  
As lavish my list of ten might seem to some researchers to be, in retrospect I suspect it is 
incomplete; one glaring omission is a representation of time, which I certainly should have 
included on the list. Intentionality (in the sense of inferring the intentions of others) perhaps 
should have been there, too. And maybe others. (Lake et al (Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & 
Gershman, 2016)don’t explicitly argue for nativism, and in fact explicitly avoid innate 
commitments, but point for a set of starting points for AI that are similar to those I suggest.) 
With the right basis list, many other skills could of course be eventually acquired. Game-based 
tree-search (if I go there, and you go there, and then I go there, where will things stand?), for 
instance, may be innate in AlphaStar, but people probably learn how to do such analyses, albeit 
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with less precision, putting together time, causality, and intentionality with a capacity for making 
cost-benefit analysis.  
An interesting trend in the machine learning field is towards something one might call 
differentiable programming (Bošnjak, Rocktäschel, Naradowsky, & Riedel, 2016; Denil, 
Colmenarejo, Cabi, Saxton, & Freitas, 2017; Graves et al., 2016). Though these systems vary in 
detail, each innately incorporates some set of microprocessor-like instructions that are operations 
over variables. In other domains, like language, many  models innately include things like tags 
for parts of speech; some include innate mechanisms for representing complex, recursive 
structure. 
How long the list really ought to be is unknown.  Pinker (1994) for example, proposed a 
significantly more extensive collection of candidate innate, evolved building blocks for humans, 
including intuitive mechanics, intuitive biology, number, habitat selection, danger including fear, 
caution, and phobia, mental maps for large territories, food, contamination, monitoring of well-
being, intuitive psychology, a mental Rolodex, self-concept, justice, kinship including elements 
such as nepotism and parenting, and mating, and concomitants such as sexual attraction and love, 
While all of these are empirical claims, each is supported by data drawn from fields such as 
cognitive and developmental psychology, ethology and neuroscience (Pinker, 1997). Each of his 
candidate domains appears to universal across humans, and in most instances there is robust 
evidence for them early in life. (Sex of course develops later, but undeniably partially under 
genetic control). In addition, neural substrates for most of the candidates on Pinker’s list are 
consistently localized across individuals, suggesting an important degree of genetic contribution 
to their neural organization 
Whether similar machinery is required for artificial general intelligence, it is, of course, an open 
empirical question. Some of the specifics that Pinker proposed (e.g. concerning mate selection) 
presumably are not relevant for artificial intelligences, others might perhaps to some degree 
derive from more general mechanisms (e.g. for cost-benefit analysis). But many others might, as 
Spelke and Carey (Carey & Spelke, 1994) have argued, start with relatively thin “cores” that are 
supplemented by cultural and experiential learning.  
The important point, for present purposes, is, that there is a whole world of possible innate 
mechanisms that AI researchers might profitably consider; simply presuming by default it is 
desirable to include little or no innate machinery seems, at best, close-minded. And, at worst, an 
unthinking commitment to relearning everything from scratch may be downright foolish, 
effectively putting each individual AI system in the position of having to recapitulate a large 
portion of a billions years of evolution. 
Incidentally, one of the weakest rejoinders I have heard to the line of argument presented in this 
article is the dubious claim that evolution is just another form of learning, but over a larger time 
scale. Well maybe, but that weakens the notion of “learning” immeasurably, such that it 
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encompasses literally everything on either side of the debate, from what Locke had in mind to 
whatever Plato and Chomsky and Pinker had in mind, and everything in between.  Relabeling the 
debate doesn’t resolve the issues, either; one might as well just use the term learning to refer to 
all change over time, regardless of mechanism, and count rock formations as the product of 
learning, too.  
Evolution (whether through natural selection or simulated artificial techniques) is a means 
towards building machinery with embedded prior knowledge, not an alternative to prior 
knowledge. 
To be sure, for now, the negative argument in this article is weaker than the stronger argument. 
The negative argument here starts with a case study of AlphaStar, and the observation that 
DeepMind has not really taken out as much human knowledge they professed to, and further 
observation that they are unlikely to achieve the same level of success if they do; these 
observations seem indisputable. 
The positive argument, which is weaker, begins with the speculation that in adding in the right 
knowledge (Monte Carlo tree search and convolution for board games, convolution without 
Monte Carlo tree search for the Atari games, and so forth) DeepMind has done better than they 
might have if they had dropped such knowledge (no convolution or Monte Carlo Search for 
either Go or Atari). That argument too, seems sound, as far it goes.  
What we don’t really know is how general that argument is -- because we haven’t really tried. To 
my knowledge there has been no known systematic search of what types of (innate) knowledge 
might be most helpful across a broad array of different types of problems.  
In many ways, the current degree of antipathy towards “heavy-handed” a priori knowledge 
seems like a reversion from what seemed clear in an earlier era. To take one example, although 
Yann LeCun has recently argued for a strenuously anti-nativist position, his most famous work, 
on convolution,  a widely-adopted, and greatly valuable  approach to innately embedding 
translational invariance in neural networks(LeCun, 1989) was based on the premise that “It is 
usually accepted that good generalization performance on real-world problems cannot be 
achieved unless some a priori knowledge about the task is built into the system.” LeCun’s 
original conclusion still seems apt: “generalization goes up ... as the amount of built-in 
knowledge goes up.” 
Of course, the right final system for AI might or might look like a neural network; such systems 
have peaked in popularity before, only to decline. But whether neural networks or some other 
architecture, or combination of architectures (Marcus, 2018) gets us to artificial general 
intelligence, LeCun’s observation still holds.  
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6. Two methodologies for proceeding in AI 
One approach to discerning how much innateness might be required for AI would be to create 
synthetic agents that do difficult tasks, with some initial degree of innateness, achieve state of the 
art performance with those tasks, and then iterate, reducing as much innateness as possible, 
ultimately converging on some (putatively) minimal amount of innate machinery. In the 
AlphaStar series of papers, DeepMind has essentially followed exactly this strategy.  
One might refer to this strategy as a “reductive” strategy, in which the goal is to achieve success 
with as small (reduced) set of innate machinery as possible.  Demis Hassabis’s 2017 presentation 
at NIPS is perhaps the finest example of that reductive strategy I have ever seen.  
But is that the right strategy? I see two problems; first, a smaller set of innate primitives is not 
inherently better; for example, biological organisms may sometimes build in machinery that in 
principle could be learned, perhaps because there is less risk to an organism if certain 
information is inherent rather than hard won through individual, potentially life-threatening 
example. A robot could learn, through experience, how to walk, but there could be advantages in 
having it come from the factory already capable of walking. If you are baby ibex scaling the side 
of cliff, you may be better off with a small but focused set of innate priors than with a more 
plastic system that would require a large number of life-threatening experiences.  Or, as is so 
often the case in biology, with the mixture; our motor systems may allow us step from birth when 
submerged partly in water. And then that innate prior for taking alternating steps gets calibrated 
with experience. Such a split system may be more robust than one that learns in any entirely 
unconstrained fashion. As Brad Wyble noted in an email, “evolution clearly has enormous 
flexibility in specifying the level of nativism for a given organism that is appropriate to the 
demands placed on it from birth.  The question is never nativism or not, but always: how much is 
a optimal for a given case?” 
Second, there is a methodological issue. If a reductive strategy succeeds in finding a small set of 
innate machinery that suffices for a narrow category of tasks, you cannot automatically conclude 
that the same machinery will suffice for all tasks. All you can reasonably conclude is that this 
machinery may well suffice for other tasks in this category, with diminishing effectiveness the 
further one moves from its core cases. The success of AlphaZero on Go, chess, and shoji, 
suggests that its mechanisms may well suffice to achieve super-human performance on perfect 
knowledge, two-player, zero-sum, deterministic, discrete games. These mechanisms may not 
suffice even for some other games, let alone for cognitive tasks generally. 
An alternative approach might start from the top down, examining properties of (e.g.) adult or 
child cognitive systems, seeking clues as to what might be innate (based on behavioral grounds), 
or conceptually necessary (as Kant argued with respect to space and time, in his Critique of Pure 
Reason (Kant, 1781). Chomsky’s argument for tree structure extended from empirical 
considerations (through the study of multiple languages); my own arguments [in The Algebraic 
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Mind] stemmed primarily from empirical considerations about the nature of human cognition. 
Spelke’s view appears to come from both directions, empirical (from the study of human infants) 
and conceptual, with an emphasis on six systems, quoting this lucid distillation from a recent 
email: 
What I believe [empirical experiments] have told us is that there are (at least) 6 systems of 
core knowledge, each centering on a set of interconnected, abstract variables:  (1) objects & 
their motions, though it isn’t clear yet whether the abstract variables are dynamic, like forces 
and masses, or kinematic, like bodies and motions.  (2) agents & their intentions & actions 
(the interconnected variables include those of utility theory ... and notions of perceptual 
access, but no notion of communication, cooperation, sharing, or phenomenal mental states; 
(3) social beings & their states of engagement (this system gives rise both to intuitive 
sociology and to the intuition that other people (and pets, etc) have phenomenal states like 
ours; (4) number (the approximate number system); (5) geometry for navigation (distance & 
direction); and (6) geometry for object recognition .. evolved to recognize and categorize 
living kinds—and then hijacked for recognizing artifacts as we started to invent them.  (There 
may be more systems but I think not too many more, because with the proliferation of core 
systems comes a search problem:  the infant will need more & more information to figure out 
which system to use on any particular occasion. 
The reductive approach is about distilling a set of cognitive primitives, by successively factoring 
out needless complexity, in the fashion that Hassabis described at NIPS. The topdown approach 
is about using what we independently know about cognition in order constrain what we might as 
starting points for AI. 
Neither approach, reductive or topdown, is inherently superior; there is virtue in the reductive 
approach followed in the AlphaStar work, and in the topdown approach exemplified by 
Chomsky, Pinker, Spelke, and myself.  7
Both approaches have their advantages. The point of the current paper is that, on the one hand, 
the matter is hardly settled, on the other, the balance between the two approaches has, across the 
field of machine learning, become seriously distorted. It’s time for AI to take nativism more 
seriously. 
 DeepMind itself uses both approaches, from time to time, although not so much in the AlphaStar project; my issue 7
in this paper is not with DeepMind’s research program as a whole, but solely with the empiricist interpretation that 
they gave the work.
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